Sovereignty as an Election Issue

What every happened to concerns over Canadian sovereignty? In this post we turn to the Harper government's position on such policies as U.S.-Canadian integrated border security and integrated national defence initiatives, as a sovereignty issue that we ought to be talking about in this election campaign.

Remember the days when sovereignty was such an issue for Canadians? If it wasn't "Sovereignty Association" and the spectre of Quebec separatism, it was accusations of selling out our sovereignty in a North American free trade agreement. Trudeau famously spoke of Canada being the mouse in bed with the American elephant. We don't hear that much about sovereignty anymore, as though our fears had crept back into the shadows with the rising of the sun. But I want to suggest that sovereignty, in the context of our relationship with the United States, should be an issue in this election.

Oh sure, the days are long gone when we Canadians suffered so much angst about how to distinguish ourselves from the Americans - George W. Bush and the Red States have put paid to that. And even the Liberals who railed against NAFTA in the 1993 election now recognize that it has been a net benefit to Canada, and that most of the sovereignty concerns raised in that debate were overblown. But that doesn't mean that there is no longer cause for concern, or that we ought to ignore the issue.

Of course, Canada and the U.S. have for some time had a degree of integration and cooperation of forces in the defence of North America. This is not the place to review the entire landscape, but NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, is the most obvious example of such integration. It was established in 1958 as a means of joint defence against possible Soviet nuclear attack, and has a joint-command structure. But in the aftermath of 9/11 the Bush administration pushed for Canadian involvement in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), with plans to make the BMD system part of the NORAD structure. Both the Chretien and Martin governments resisted involvement in BMD, but came under enormous pressure from the U.S. In The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar, Janice Stein and Eugene Lang describe how Canada's decisions to get ever more deeply involved in the Afghan war were driven by a perceived need to mollify the U.S. over Canada's reluctance to be involved in BMD, and its refusal to join the coalition in the invasion of Iraq.

The Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defense have a long-standing bias in favor of closer relations and more integrated operations with the U.S. military. It is not only an issue of being able to play with the big boys, but it provides access to important intelligence and provides opportunities to enhance the CF's operational capabilities in all sorts of ways. But there are reasons to be concerned that the Harper government has been entering into agreements with the United States that could seriously compromise the country's sovereignty.

Consider that in February of 2008 the Canadian and U.S. governments signed an agreement in Texas, the Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan (CAP), which provides that the armed forces of each country can send its troops across the border into the other country in the event of a terrorist attack or other crisis. Moreover, this supplements a separate agreement, the Canada-United States Combined Defense Plan (CDP) (apparently not available on-line), which provides for similar movement of troops across borders in support for law enforcement operations. While the U.S. Northern Command publicized the agreement, the Canadian government made no similar announcement, leading several organizations to voice concerns.

The CAP specifies that the support will only be provided after being agreed to by "appropriate authorities" in both governments. Yet the agreement specifies that the U.S. Secretary of Defense can in emergency situations deploy forces across the border prior to obtaining "concurrence" from the Secretary of State. One is left to wonder whether he could similarly do so without "concurrence" from the Canadian government. Moreover, there have been occasions in the past when such protocols have been ignored by the United States when the perceived risk to U.S. interests was high. There are persistent rumors that NORAD took action to deploy fighter aircraft after 9/11, including operations in Canadian airspace, prior to any consultation with the Canadian officers within NORAD or members of the Canadian government.

Another example of this continuing trend was the announcement in July of last year of the United States-Canada Joint Border Threat and Risk Assessment. On its face the document merely describes the various threats that the two countries share in common. But with the unveiling of the document the two governments also announced a joint-border security plan, the Canada-U.S. Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, aimed primarily at preventing terrorist attacks and other threats at the bridges and border crossing between the two countries. One of the primary objectives of the plan is to improve the information flow between the agencies of the two governments - meaning that the personal information of Canadians will be increasingly shared with U.S. government agencies.

There is of course a need for the U.S. and Canada to cooperate on issues of national security, law enforcement, and anti-terrorism efforts. But there is also a crucial need for the Canadian government to ensure that Canadian sovereignty, and the rights of Canadian nationals, remain protected, and not bargained away in agreements entered into by a pandering Canadian government ever desperate to remain in American good graces. The Americans are, at the end of the day, single-mindedly pursuing their own national self-interest, and they have shown themselves time and time again to be ready to run rough-shod over the rights and interests of their allies when the perceived need arises.

Canadian are indeed concerned about the possibility that a unified North American security perimeter will dangerously erode Canadian sovereignty, on issues as disparate as immigration, privacy, and national security itself. Moreover, the polls suggest that an overwhelming number of Canadians, over 90%, say that negotiations of such agreements with the U.S. should be undertaken in public, with maximum transparency. There really is very little basis for arguing that the agreements need to be kept classified for national security reasons.

The central point here is that Canadians are entitled to more information on precisely what agreements the Canadian government is entering into, and what they mean for Canadian sovereignty. What is striking about the agreements discussed above, is that they disclose so little about the details of implementation. They are all broad brush objectives, with no information regarding the ramifications of execution. Moreover, as in the case of the CAP, the Canadian government has actually refrained from discussing the issues. Canadians have a right to know more, and we should be making this issue of our relationship with the United States a subject of discussion in the election. - CM.